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Abstract. This study aims at understanding U.S. media coverage of 
China's relationship with its mostly Muslim minority group Uighur during 
the period of several deadly attacks conducted by members from Uighur 
ethnic group. The study looks into 52 news stories and 3 opinion pieces in 
the New York Times and the Washington Post in a six-month period. 
Drawn from the theories of news framing and news narratives, the analysis 
found that the news discourse about China’s Uighur unrest presented a 
clear-cut vision of a repressive government and a prisoned intellectual 
Ilham Tohti. This image conjures two major mythical elements: the 
repressive villain and the persecuted hero. By attributing the ultimate 
blame unanimously to government control and policy, the articles 
employed a resentment frame to portray China's ethnic relationships and 
downplayed the severity of actual attacks. 
1 Introduction 
Humans seek to comprehend and make sense of individual events, including 
tragedies in our world. News, as one major source of public knowledge, 
provides us with narratives and helps construct a social reality that is coherent 
and meaningful [1, 2]. International news, in particular, opens a window for 
people to understand things that happened on the other side of the world. They 
might be the only source for people to learn about the political institutions and 
social conflicts that are different from their own. At the same time, journalism, 
as an “authored text” [1] is never free from values. Journalists embed individual 
facts into bigger frames and use storytelling techniques to pass on assumptions, 
attitudes and values. 
Two different lines of theoretical development and empirical studies, 
namely, news framing and news narrative studies, focus on these underlying 
elements of news and try to explain how journalists use consistent themes, 
frames, myth and archetypes to diagnose causes and provide moral reasoning  
[3, 4, 5, 6]. Although framings and narratives research come from different 
intellectual lineage, they both offered lenses to examine the power of 
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journalism to give meanings, pass on values and provide moral judgments. In 
this sense, they could be used together to understand news portrayal of 
international events and offer an insightful account of ethnicity, conflicts and 
politics, because international reporting often requires journalists to provide 
more contexts and explanations. This study tries to combine theoretical 
contributions of news framing and news narrative research with an analysis of 
the coverage of deadly attacks conducted by ethnic minority groups in China.  
In the year of 2014, several deadly attacks conducted by people from 
Uighur ethnic minority group in China have drawn international attention. 
Among them, the Kunming Train Station mass stabbing in March left more 
than 30 innocent passengers dead and more than 140 injured. In May 40 
civilians were killed ruthlessly in a market attack in the capital city of Xinjiang 
Province. Following attacks happened in rural areas of Xinjiang province later, 
and the two most deadly ones happened in the county of Shache and Luntai, 
where groups of attackers started with assaulting government offices and police 
stations, and both Uighur attackers and civilians were killed in these clashes. 
Uighur is one of China’s 55 ethnical minority groups, and most of its people 
live in the country’s northwestern province Xinjiang and practice the religion of 
Sunni Islam.  
Chinese government and media called these attacks terrorist attacks incited 
by separatism forces while the U.S. news coverage of these incidents and 
China’s relationship with its ethnical minorities paints a different picture. 
Scholars have argued that news discourse often does not and cannot capture an 
objective reality. Instead, it highlights certain aspects of an issue and 
downplays others by employing frames and telling tales [3, 7, 8]. U.S. 
newspaper coverage of these attacks and why they happened can reflect and 
confirm not only the nature of these events, but also the values and beliefs that 
are consistent with a shared reality about China in the American public.  
This article studied the New York Times and the Washington Post’s 
coverage of Uighur groups against the background of the unrest and terrorist 
attacks. The article will first trace out how terrorist and terrorism were often 
portrayed and how issues about China were discussed in U.S. media. The 
concept of news myth and news framing were adopted to analyze important 
events under each category. Then the fifty-five news stories and opinion pieces 
on the Uighur attacks will be examined in a textual analysis to explore how the 
story of terror in China were framed and retold in U.S. mainstream media.  
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Media coverage of Muslim group and terrorism 
Previous studies on U.S. media’s coverage on Muslim groups found that news media tend 
to quickly associate terrorism with Muslim and Islam and feed a narrative emphasizing fear 
and violence after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 [9, 10]. This negative association in media 
magnified the reality of “Islamic extremism” and reinforced an Orientalism ideology that 
widened the divide between “Self (Western world)” and “Others (So called Orient that are 
different from Western world)” [11, 12].  
One way to look at this misrepresentation of terrorism is the framing theory. News 
media constantly employ “frames” to tell stories and making sense of complicated events. 
Scholars argue that news frame works as an interpretive structure and help journalists 
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identify problems, assign values and provide solutions [13]. Intentionally or 
unintentionally, news writers emphasize certain aspects of the issue while excluding other 
factors that they consider irrelevant or less important. The coverage of international tragic 
events like terrorist attacks often adopted a frame that is consistent with U.S. foreign policy 
or administrative stand. Certain policy catchphrase invented by government administration, 
such as the “War on Terror” label, can be internalized by journalists in their daily discourse, 
reified as an uncontested thing and naturalized as a taken-for-granted worldview in the 
news coverage [14]. 
As media become an integral part of American politics, journalists adopt the language 
and perspective of the political establishment, particularly in foreign affairs coverage 
Sometimes the news coverage can in turn influence politics. Entman examined U.S. media 
coverage of the shooting down of two passenger planes in 1980s, one shot down by a 
Soviet fight plane, another shot done by a U.S. Navy ship, and found that U.S. media 
outlets employed different frames in telling the stories [4]. By eliciting moral evaluations in 
the former story and framing the later one as a technical accident, these two kinds of frames 
reinforced and strengthened public belief of “Soviet’s moral guilt” and legitimized U.S. 
military policies in the Gulf [4]. 
The way news stories are structured and produced can also be understood through the 
perspective of myth. Myth exists in journalists’ storytelling traditions and underlies and 
sustains certain ideologies and social values [8]. Bird and Dardenne [3] believed the 
journalistic use of myth, the illusion to heroes, villains, scapegoats and archetypal 
principles and figures, has a function of explaining and comforting. They argued that, “one 
function of myth is to explain which cannot be easily explained […] as well as more 
intangible things, such as notions of morality, appropriateness and fairness. This […] was a 
function of people’s intolerance for randomness, inexplicability and ambiguity. [3]” U.S. 
media have constantly resorted to myths to make sense of traumatic events in its own 
history. Lule [8] studied the major myths used in the New York Times editorials after the 
September 11th terrorist attack. He pointed out that the allusion to shattered innocence, the 
victims, the heroes and the anxiety about future constructed a strategy to proclaim and 
sustain social order. Berkowitz [15] explored the mythical narratives in news stories and 
opinion pieces after the Virginia Tech shooting and found that the reference to the 
Holocaust and the allusion to an ironic hero who survived the Holocaust but died in the 
shooting attack have served a function in the public healing process. 
Most of existing studies on Muslim and terrorist attacks focused on the narrative of 
incidents happened on the soil of U.S., where there are major tensions between American 
people and Muslim individuals (or groups). U.S. news discourse on Muslim in other 
countries might adopt a different strategy. The present research looked into several 
disastrous attacks happened in China and explored how U.S. media employ frames and 
myth in making sense of a terrible event that happened outside United States.  
2.2 Media coverage of China 
An analysis of U.S. media coverage of attacks happened in China cannot overlook the 
important tradition of how China was often portrayed in U.S. news discourse. U.S. media 
coverage of issues in China have been found to be related to the international relations 
between the two countries and U.S. foreign policy at different times [16, 17, 18]. Retzinger 
and Scheff [19] pointed out that a country’s ideology both produce and is produced by the 
narrative that it tells to itself and the others about conflicts. Therefore, a look into the news 
rhetoric about China cannot be fully understood without acknowledging the two countries 
political, economical and ideological differences and competition. U.S. International 
Relation theorists argues that China’s growing capabilities has become a potential threat for 
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U.S. economy and in the competition for global powers [20, 21]. Pan [22] proposed that the 
“China threat” literatures are “not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, 
preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, 
meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and 
helps transform the ‘China threat’ into social reality.”  
Turner [23] conducted case studies on the representations of China in different historical 
periods and showed that the image of a dangerous China helps reaffirm U.S. identity from 
time to time. Their studies on IR literatures suggest a myth of “China threat” that was 
imagined by U.S. politicians and scholars and legitimized U.S. ideology as universal and 
indispensable. Compared to international relation study literature and political speeches, 
news media play an even more important role in constructing reality for American public 
and reinforcing the ideology and moral values of U.S. political system in the world. 
Therefore, the rhetoric of an internationally influential elite media such as the New York 
Times and the Washington Post can be seen as a relatively subtle, powerful and natural way 
to influence public beliefs and values. Therefore, the ways that this article addresses and 
implies about China’s policy and ideology will be another focus of this study. 
Besides these studies on International Relations literature, scholars also studied the U.S. 
news discourse on several important events in China and argued that media framing and 
invocation of these singular incidents should be seen as a representative part of the overall 
media framing about China [24, 25]. Lee et al. [26] examined New York Times and 
Washington Post’s editorial use of and reference to the 1989 Tiananmen protests and its 
crackdown as a “news icon” over a period of 20 years and found that this event was initially 
used as a powerful symbol of totalitarian dictatorship in China, then becomes a symbol of 
China’s human rights violation in 1990s, and at last turn into a less-powerful ritualistic 
memory of China’s repression in news editorials. Another analysis of media frames 
employed on reporting the Hong Kong’s reunification with China in 1997 found that the 
coverage of the event can be summarized into ideological packages that projected Hong 
Kong’s loss of freedom under Chinese rule and its potential role as a “Trojan horse” to 
spread political and economic changes in China [27]. 
The previous researches on media coverage of both terrorism and China have informed 
the coding and analysis of this study. The present study thus asked two general research 
questions: 1). How were the Uighur attacks and violence in China framed in U.S. 
mainstream media? 2). To view all the news stories and opinion pieces on this issue as 
integral parts of a constructed reality, how was blame and responsibility attributed and the 
hero identified in the form of myth? A textual analysis will be used to answer these 
research questions. 
3 Methodology 
This study examined 52 news stories and 3 editorial pieces on the New York Times and the 
Washington Post about the relationship between Chinese government and Uighur minority 
during the period of the four most deadly Uighur attacks in 2014 (from the first attack in 
March 1st to one week after the fourth attack on September 21st). Both the New York Times 
and the Washington Post have long been regarded as the most influential national 
newspapers that influences and represents U.S. foreign policies and set the political agenda 
for public issues [28, 29, 30]. Therefore, their coverage of China and its ethnic conflicts can 
be seen as an indication of U.S. foreign policy toward China and a reflection of the public 
narrative about China in the mass media.  
The search term “Xinjiang” and “Uighur” are used together to find as many related 
articles as possible and yielded a result of 99 stories in total. The researcher then went 
through every article and eliminated all the articles that is not related to the attacks or 
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violence. Words like “unrest,” “tension,” “clashes” and “violence” were all considered as 
an allusion to the attacks; articles with these words were thus included in the final group of 
articles. 
The texts were then analyzed with a coding sheet designed both deductively and 
inductively (See Appendix A). Questions such as “Did the article use a thematic or episodic 
frame to describe the attack(s),” and “How was the blame of the attack(s) attributed?” were 
drawn from the framing theory literature [7, 31]. Questions such as “Who was identified as 
the villain in this article?” “Is there a hero in the story, how was he/she described?” were 
drawn from the news myth literature [3, 8, 15]. Quotations in all the articles were closely 
examined, too, as journalists also constantly filter their sources and make decisions on 
whom to quote. Quotations, as well as background information provided in a story, help 
build the theme and support a point a view in news stories [31]. Due to the specific subject 
of this study, the coding sheet also inductively include items about the image of Uighur 
people, the image of Xinjiang region, the label of the attacks (whether it used the label of 
terrorist attacks or not) and the phrase used to describe the relationship between Chinese 
government and Uighur minority group to fully capture the constructed reality about the 
violence, the hero and an “repressive” China in U.S. media.  
Because one person coded all the selected articles based on the code sheet, the study 
examined individual words and phrases to ensure that the data were analyzed rigorously. 
Representative wordings in the article are also presented in the analysis to ensure 
transparency. For example, to code for the question concerning villains in the article, the 
researcher looked for specific phrases that directs blame or depicts an oppressive power. 
Sentences and words that are ambiguous are not included in the analysis. 
4 Analysis 
The articles in New York Times and the Washington Post covered a variety of aspects in 
the unrest. The themes of the articles ranged from the attacks themselves, Chinese 
government’s response toward the attacks, feature stories about the region’s Xinjiang and 
Uighur minority groups, the arrest and trial of suspects, and interestingly, the arrest and 
trial of a Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti. Out of 55 articles, only 15 focused on the violent acts 
themselves. And even in the article that talks about individual attack, the journalist tend to 
adopt a thematic frame instead of an episodic frame to discuss the causes and background 
information. Violent attacks in China and Uighur minority groups are both distant and 
unfamiliar concepts to most of American readers, therefore it is necessary for the journalists 
to provide some context to make sense of the incidents and help readers understand 
potential factors of the crime. In this sense, most of the articles offered some explanation on 
the attacks and its consequences. A detailed description of the myths and frames used in 
these explanations will be discussed as followed.  
4.1 The Repressive Villain  
In a majority of the news stories and opinion pieces, the blame of violence and unrest is 
partially or fully attributed to the policies of Chinese government or the Communist party. 
A picture of an oppressive central government is the repeating theme in all the stories. The 
unrest was described as “an inevitable result of Beijing’s continued repression” (“Pushing 
the Uighurs too far,” NYT, March 19). Some articles even put it more openly, saying, “The 
escalation of violence is the direct result of China’s repression” (“The Price of China’s 
Repression,” NYT, September 26). China’s policies were often described as “Beijing’s iron 
rule” or “Beijing’s heavy-handed tactics” in a lot of articles, while Uighur people were 
depicted as victims “chafed under Chinese rule” (“Ethnic Tension in China’s Xinjiang 
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Province,” WP, March 3) and “backed into a corner by Beijing’s relentless antagonizing 
tactics” (“Pushing the Uighurs too far,” NYT, March 19). Even in articles that tried to show 
two sides of the arguments, as Chinese government blame the attacks on Islam extremists 
while Uighur exile groups blame them to Chinese government’s crackdown, the Chinese 
official’s accounts were always put into less important position and called into question 
later with an indication that there’s something more severe and scary than the recent deadly 
attacks on civilians: 
Chinese authorities described the mass slaughter as a “premeditated, violent terrorist 
attack” perpetuated by separatists from Xinjiang. […] Clashes over the past year have 
claimed more than 100 lives, many of them Uighurs killed by security forces during what 
officials describe as terrorist attacks. Uighur exile groups blame for the bloodshed on 
paramilitary police officers they say have been given the green light to use deadly force 
against unarmed protest. (“China Remodels an Ancient Silk Road City, and an Ethnic Rift 
Widens,” NYT, March 6) 
It is interesting to note that the government account of the attacks were always put in 
quotation marks while the Uighur groups and Western experts’ point of view were often 
presented without a quotation mark. In this way, the reporters kept their distance from 
whatever Chinese government and media says about the attacks and legitimize the narrative 
from Uighur exile groups.  
Related to this issue is the emphasis on China’s propaganda efforts, which suggest a 
deceitful agenda behind all the investigation and responses to the attacks. In all of the 
articles, the blame to the separatist (or terrorist) groups was always immediately followed 
by “says government-run Xinhua News Agency” or “according to a government-run 
website.” In this way, the intricate relations between Chinese government and any media 
outlet were always identified openly. However, the background of other sources, such as 
the Radio Free Asia (a U.S. government funded radio station), was not explained.  
Furthermore, lengthy descriptions about Chinese government’s propaganda schemes 
become a recurring context in a lot of the articles. Some stories went in-depth about the 
specific propagandas the government has executed: “the state media showcased a new 
‘harmonious village’ where the two ethnicities would live side by side” (“Uighur Scholar’s 
Life Sentence is Seen as China’s Effort to Stifle Debate on Minorities,” NYT, September 
25). Chinese government’s efforts to educate Uighur women and provide them with 
training classes were described as “Beijing has spent heavily wooing women in Xinjiang” 
and “cheerful propaganda” (“Veils Emerge as Sign of Uighur Protest in China,” NYT, 
August 8).  
One of the New York Times article devoted all its content on how “party-run history 
machine” made up historical stories from the real cause of country’s disastrous famine to 
the blaming of United States for starting the Korean War. It summarized, “China’s 
Communist Party has devoted enormous resources to composing historical narratives that 
seek to legitimize its rule and obfuscate its failure” (“In China, Myth of Social Cohesion,” 
NYT, August 19). 
By identifying most of the governmental policies and programs as propaganda and 
making the propaganda as the most salient background of the attacks and unrest, these news 
coverage and editorials discredit explanations made by Chinese government and suggest 
that the repression and propaganda is something more important and more horrible than 
attackers killing innocent people on the street. And the attacks were just an extreme form of 
“Uighurs resistance to rule by Han majority.” 
Although some of the articles did mention an “Islamist militant group” blamed by the 
Chinese government for the attacks, but the author always went back to blame Chinese 
government’s suppression as the ultimate explanation for all the violence. For example, in 
one of the Washington Post article that focused on the jihadist threat posed by Uighur 
 
    
 
 
DOI: 10.1051/, 00017 (2017) 73300017
 
33SHS Web of Conferences shsconf/201
i-COME'16 
6
extremists, the author spent the first half of the articles talking about how U.S. and China 
might have a common interest in cooperation against militant from Islamic State, and then 
spent the second half of the article condemning China’s domestic policy: 
But China’s focus on the external threat inspiration for some of the violence in Xinjiang 
is missing the bigger picture, experts say. The long-running and brutal suppression of 
Uighur rights, culture and nationalist sentiment has bred deep resentment here while an 
intensified campaign to educate people by turning them away from Islam — preventing 
women from wearing veils and students from attending mosques for example — seems to 
have caused even more anger (“China Faces Jihadist Threat at Home and Abroad,” WP, 
September 8). 
In sum, most of the articles employed a frame of repression and fear in the coverage 
over the course of six month in between these four attacks. Interestingly, the fear is not 
directed towards the attackers (if not terrorists), in fact, the attacks were often used merely 
as a background to the portrayal of China’s ruthless domestic policies and silencing of 
dissidents. The narrative of most of the articles identified a bigger source of fear, a villain 
government, who carried out crackdowns, surveillance and propaganda, a villain who 
pursued economic and political policies that were unfair to its minority. And this villain is 
the real cause for all the resentment that leads to violence. 
4.2 The Imprisoned Hero 
The hero in this narrative is, naturally, the oppressed. But he is not any kind of Uighur 
under government surveillance and control. The hero, Ilham Tohti, is the intelligent and 
politically active scholar who was found guilty of “inciting ethnical separatist” and 
prisoned by the Chinese government. Most of the articles identified Ilham Tohti as a 
“Uighur economist” or “the most prominent Uighur scholar,” which give him a sense of 
intellectual credibility of speaking out for Uighurs and calling for political changes. He 
taught economics at the Central University of Nationalities and had a website that tried to 
encourage communication between Uighur and Han people; the latter is the majority 
ethnical group in China. He was arrested in January for inciting students to violence. Tohti 
is a recurring character in most of the articles, not only in the fourteen articles that focused 
on his trial and conviction. His name is also frequently mentioned in other articles that talk 
about the attacks and governments’ strategies to tamp down the violence as an archetypal 
figure of the victim under government repression.  
The news stories described his careers and works as “building bridges between Han 
Chinese and Uighurs” and “a model of moderation.” By portraying him as a bridge builder 
and moderate dissident who does not want to do any harm to the unity of China, the 
repressive villains’ allegation and strategy seems even more irrational and outrageous: “The 
sentence [of Ilham Tohti] is a sign of confusion and desperation behind the governments’ 
policies toward Uighurs” (“Fruitless Repression,” NYT, September 29). The articles that 
focused on his trial and sentence also consistently gave Tohti benefit of doubt by devoting a 
majority of their content quoting his layer, wife and his daughter who studied in United 
States. Foreign experts and groups were also frequently quoted to condemn China’s unfair 
treatment and support Tohti’s innocence, while the actual charges against him were often 
accompanied by the word “reportedly.” 
In addition, the situation of Tohti’s imprisonment was described in detail with similar 
structures across publications. Articles in both the New York Times and the Washington 
Post talked about him being shackled, his hunger strike, and how prison officials have 
refused him food in the following days. To this point, the news discourse further changed 
the direction of attention from attackers’ constant mass slaughtering during these six 
months to the dreadful accusation of a single intellectual by the repressive government. 
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4.3 The Attacks and the people as a backdrop 
As mentioned earlier, brutal attacks were not the focus in most of the articles and were used 
just as a background to discuss other issues. Sometimes they were mentioned as a lead to 
the criticism of China’s “anti-terrorism steps;” other times they were brought up to explain 
Ilham Tohti’s arrest. In one of the articles that focused on Ilham Tohti’s imprisonment, the 
whole article only mentioned one attack once (the Kunming train station deadly stabbing) at 
the end of one sentence: 
[Ilham Tohti] went on a hunger strike in January for 10 days because his food was not halal — 
prepared according to Muslim religious traditions — and was denied food by prison authorities for a 
similar period after Uighur separatists carried out a deadly knife attack in the city of Kunming in 
March (“Uighur Scholar Faces Chinese Trial that Critics Say Highlights Repression,” WP, 
September 17). 
In fact, during this period of six months, and out of 55 articles, only 15 news stories 
were talking about specific attacks. The rest of the articles gave the attacks a secondary role 
and a majority of them rejected the label of terrorist attacks. The incidents were called “big, 
bloody race riot,” “a deadly wave of ethnic violence,” “mass slaughter,” “train station 
rampage.” The description of the attacks and the restive situation still invokes fear, but by 
dissociating them from terrorism, the responsibility of the violence were wholly attributed 
to bad government policies.  
The attacks were also constantly associated with the label “protests” and framed as a 
response to political repression instead of malicious sabotage. This kind of frame can be 
best summarized in one article, the reporter claimed, “their protests are a reaction” 
(“Clashes, anti-terrorism steps worsen China’s Uighur Ties,” WP, May 11). Another article 
went back to an earlier attack in 2009 and elaborated the course of events in detail: “after a 
heavy-handed police response, the protests spiraled into ethnic bloodletting, claiming 
nearly 200 lives, most of them Han”(“Chinese Officials Seek to Shift Attention From 
Rampage,” NYT, March 5). The attacks and violence, according to the news narratives, 
becomes some kind of last resort and a side effect of peaceful protests for a just political 
cause.  
Besides the backdrop of constant violence, these articles’ depiction of the relationship 
between Chinese government and Uighur minority groups focused on a frame of 
resentment and fragmentation. The word “resentment” and “hatred” were used frequently 
when talking about Uighur people’s attitudes toward both central government and the 
majority Han people. The articles also suggested a fundamental divide instead of cohesion 
between Uighur minority groups and the rest of the country: “Xinjiang, rich in resources 
and strategically important, lies on the borders of Central Asia and is home to the mainly 
Muslim Uighurs, who speak a Turkic language and are culturally distinct from China’s 
ethnic Han majority” (“Market Attack Kills 31 in Far Western China,” WP, May 23). 
Similar depiction of Xinjiang and Uighur people appears again and again in articles to 
make the cultural, linguistic and religious divergence between Uighur and Han the most 
salient characteristic of the region and the people. 
The background information about Xinjiang as an “ethnically divided region that has 
been convulsed by mounting violence” and about the Uighur-Han relations as “an ethnic 
rift” seems to suggest that the region and the people have irreconcilable differences with the 
rest of the country. This narrative downplays any similarities, friendships and cooperation 
and domestic unity among different ethnical groups or discredits them as government 
propaganda. In this way, the call for independence and “autonomy” were legitimized and 
the strategies to identify and restrict separatist forces were portrayed as a sign of intrusion 
and outside repression. 
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5 Discussion 
This study present the stories told in the New York Times and Washington Post presented 
about China’s Uighur unrest. These stories offered a clear-cut vision of a repressive 
government and a prisoned intellectual Ilham Tohti. The depiction conjures two major myth 
elements: the repressive villain and the persecuted hero. By attributing the ultimate blame 
unanimously to government control, unfair policies and even the problematic political 
system, these articles framed the attacks as unpreventable tragedies caused by the 
government’s repression. The attackers’ role as villain was blurred and downplayed; 
China’s crackdown on what they believed as terrorist movement was so severe and 
inhumane that it surpassed the priority of covering the actual events. Even in the actual 
coverage of singular events, to understand the cruel tragedies happened in another country, 
U.S. media resorted to myth to make sense of the event, and by portraying China as an 
authoritarian society under moral scrutiny of U.S. democratic standards, the villain myth 
also helped U.S. to distance itself from this kind of tragedy. This finding is consistent with 
what Lee et al. [26] found in their study about how U.S. mainstream media has associated 
the Tiananmen as a symbolic reference to an Authoritarian government and its human 
rights abuses. The coverage of the Uighur unrest reinforces and reuses this already 
constructed image of a repressive China and its human rights problems. 
In addition, the articles also employ a frame of fear and resentment in its coverage of 
the relationship between Uighur groups and the Han-dominated government. The narrative 
indicates a hostile situation among all the groups in Xinjiang and project a future of 
dreadful backslash and more severe clashes. At last, different from the common negative 
portrayal of Muslim people in U.S. media, the image of the Muslim Uighur are depicted in 
a sympathetic light as they, as an entire ethnic group, undergone the heavy-handed 
repression of Chinese government. An intellectual from Uighur group, Ilham Tohti, were 
given great attention in the coverage and his argument about the unfair economic and 
political conditions of Uighurs were reiterated in a lot of articles. This positive and 
sympathetic depiction of Uighur people’s life and their marginalization as a minority group 
provided counter narrative for Muslim groups in U.S. media.  
 The conventional frames adopted in U.S. media’s coverage of terrorism often provided 
a one-sided context that make one simple explanation seem natural and render 
contradictory interpretations hard to fit into the preexisting viewpoint [32, 33]. The finding 
of this study suggests that there could be alternative frames in covering violent attacks. By 
empathizing with Muslim minorities who faced economic and political predicament and 
individuals who were imprisoned by government due to national security reasons, the news 
media can provide a better platform for multiple communities to express the meaning and 
interpretation of similar events. 
The authors of these articles from time to time employed different frames in their 
arguments. For example, one article in the New York Times pointed out in the end that, 
“management of diversity and pluralism is a pressing world issue, from Scotland, Ukarine 
to Ferguson, Mo” (“Fruitless Repression,” NYT, September 29). To see the problem from 
an international perspective and to compare it with other similarly complicated issues, even 
problems facing United States itself, is to veer away from targeting a single villain and 
ignoring other aspects of the factors that caused violence. However, most of the times, even 
in this editorial piece, the author came back to imposing an U.S. dominant ideological to 
evaluate foreign issues. 
This study has several limitations. First, it only analyzed U.S. mainstream newspapers’ 
coverage of Uighur attacks happened in China. Future studies could use a comparative 
method to see if there are differences between the coverage of attacks conducted by 
minority groups in China and attacks happened in U.S. or other Western countries. This 
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study of the New York Times and the Washington Post coverage of foreign issues also raise 
further questions on how it corresponds with U.S. foreign policy or how it can influence 
public opinion. A more detailed study that combined an examination of Sino-U.S. 
relationships and with the media coverage of attacks (the earliest deadly attack started from 
2009) over the years can be conducted to investigate this relationship. 
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